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Criminal Insanity: 
Concepts and Evidence
ANDERS LØVLIE*
1. Topic and Structure 
Rules of law state what is required for legal action—law applies to facts. Rules on 
criminal insanity define mental states which exclude criminal responsibility. The 
point made in this article is that the choice of legal criteria for rules on criminal in-
sanity has evidential implications, and that these implications need to be taken into 
account in the process of making and in the process of applying the law.
This article contributes to the international debate on criminal insanity by pre-
senting an analytical model of possible legal concepts of criminal insanity and by 
highlighting the evidential aspects of these concepts. The model is illustrated with 
examples from different jurisdictions, including examples from the Norwegian de-
bate on criminal insanity and the process that led to the amendment of the Nor-
wegian rule on criminal insanity in 2019. The arguments made are general and of 
relevance to all types of legal regulations on divergent mental states.
In section 2, I show that rules on criminal insanity follow from general principles 
concerning the justification for punishment. In section 3, I identify different ways to 
model rules on criminal insanity. In section 4, I show that the choice of legal criteria 
has important evidential implications, and I discuss how to prove the mental states 
that different legal criteria refer to. In section 5, I address the regulation of uncertain-
ty of mental states. Section 6 provides a summary of the findings.
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Bergen Journal of Criminal Law and Criminal Justice • 1/2019
79
2. Justifi cation 
The use of punishment can be justified as retribution and as a tool for social policy. 
The first line of reasoning relies on criminal liability being reasonable and just. The 
second line of reasoning relies on assumptions concerning the benefits of punishment, 
including assumptions about how the threat of punishment prevents criminal acts.
Within western jurisdictions, there is a long tradition with a high degree of con-
sensus stating that it is both unreasonable and nonsensible to punish offenders ‘of 
unsound mind’. The justifications for the use of punishment are not considered valid 
for offenders with no or very limited choice of action. This is reflected in legislation 
and court practice concerning the requirements for imposing punishment: mental 
capacity and maturity are prerequisites for punishment. Moreover, we consider suffi-
cient but limited maturity and capacity as mitigating sentencing factors. 
The rules on criminal insanity hinge on fundamental questions about responsi-
bility and human rationality, both of which are subject to continuous debate. There 
is no reason to be optimistic that there will ever be agreement regarding the justifi-
cations for punishment, or that a unified understanding of humans as rational actors 
will be reached. A comparison of insanity rules across jurisdictions makes this ongo-
ing debate evident. When defining who to exempt from criminal responsibility, dif-
ferent jurisdictions rely on somewhat vague and cloudy concepts, and a wide range 
of formulations are used to pinpoint those considered to be of ‘unsound mind’.1
In addition to having different underlying values and different understandings 
of human rationality, jurisdictions differ in their legal systematisation. In some ju-
risdictions, for example in Norway, the question of sanity is handled as a primary 
condition for criminal responsibility. In other jurisdictions, such as the U.S., a claim 
of criminal insanity is understood as a possible defence.
3. Conceptual Perspective 
3.1 Introduction
Legal rules can be categorised in different ways, one of which is to differentiate be-
tween legal criteria based on their characteristics. In the following, I distinguish be-
tween different legal criteria for criminal insanity by identifying features of impor-
tance for the satisfaction of those criteria. 
1 For a comprehensive analysis of the law in Denmark, Sweden, Finland, Germany, England, the 
U.S. and in International Criminal Law, see Official Norwegian Report NOU 2014:10, Criminal 
Capacity, Expertise and Societal Protection, English Translation, Excerpts, chapter 7. The 
author was, together with Nils Gunnar Skretting and Anne Wie, secretary of the commission 
that delivered the report. 
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To apply most rules on criminal insanity, several criteria have to be fulfilled. In this 
article the focus is narrower, as the rules are broken down and features of the criteria 
are singled out. The purpose is to identify characteristics of these criteria, and not to 
present rules on criminal insanity.
The conceptual characteristics are clarified to ensure a point of departure for the 
discussion in section 4 concerning the evidential consequences of choice of criteria. 
Thus, the conceptual advantages and disadvantages of different criteria are not dis-
cussed in light of the justifications or ontological positions regarding human action 
addressed in section 2. 
The clarification starts with the dichotomy between legal criteria with ‘medical 
reference’ on the one hand, and legal criteria with ‘non-medical reference’ on the 
other. The former refers to a group of criteria that make reference to categorisations 
in medical diagnosis systems or to other medical concepts, discussed in section 3.2. 
General features of this group are identified in section 3.2.1, and within this group I 
make further distinction between criteria referring to specific diagnoses and criteria 
referring to abstract diagnoses in section 3.2.2. 
Criteria with non-medical reference rely on more ordinary and widespread un-
derstandings of mental illnesses and are discussed in section 3.3. Within this group, I 
distinguish between criteria formulated as legal standards, addressed in section 3.3.1, 
and criteria referring to plain value judgements, addressed in section 3.3.2. The for-
mer are discussed in general in section 3.3.1.1, and then in more detail as referring to 
specific, abstract and disputed mental phenomena in section 3.3.1.2. 
Finally, in section 3.4 I discuss the strategy of combining different criteria to de-
fine those of ‘unsound mind’. This is addressed in general in section 3.4.1, and in 
light of the Norwegian discussion on criminal insanity regulations that resulted in an 
amendment of the Norwegian rule on criminal insanity in section 3.4.2. 
3.2 Medical Criteria  
3.2.1 In General  
Legal criteria can refer to medical concepts and use these as tools to define and identify 
legally relevant mental states. This is useful since you ensure a concept based on research 
and clinical experience, developed over time and with a great degree of consensus. 
Today, most medical concepts will be rooted in a medical classification system, 
primarily ICD-10 or DSM-5.2 These medical diagnostic norm systems are similar in 
2 International Statistical Classification of Diseases and Related Health Problems 10th version by 
the World Health Organization, and Diagnostic and Statistical Manual of Mental Disorders 5th 
version published by the American Psychiatric Association.
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structure to judicial norm systems. The medical systems set out terms for diagnoses, 
and the law sets terms for legal effects. In both systems, you find conditions for con-
sequences that ensure predictability, equal treatment and the possibility for control—
features that make both systems rational. 
However, the requirements and intentions underlying the systems differ in sub-
stance. Medical diagnosis systems are developed for health purposes, while the ju-
dicial system is developed to regulate society. Hence, the definitions of the medical 
system have no bearing on whether there should be legal consequences attached to 
specific diagnoses. 
This substantial and functional difference between the systems is addressed in 
the U.S. classification system for psychiatry (DSM-5):  
‘[I]t is important to note that the definition of mental disorder included in DSM-5 was 
developed to meet the needs of clinicians, public health professionals, and research inves-
tigators rather than all the technical needs of the courts and legal professionals.’3
In other words, as a starting point there is no connection between the medical sys-
tem and the judicial system, and it would be a result of a pure coincidence if a medi-
cal concept answers the societal need for a legal regulation.4
3.2.2 Specific or Abstract Reference 
The characterisation of something as ‘specific’ indicates that it can be identified, de-
tected and perceived. Hence, rules on criminal insanity which refer to diagnoses or 
diagnostic groups in a diagnostic system, or to otherwise pure medical concepts, can 
be said to have criteria referring to specific diagnoses. The Norwegian Penal Code sec-
tion 20, first paragraph letter b, has a specific reference:
‘To be liable for punishment the offender must be accountable at the time of the act. The 
offender is not accountable if, at the time of the act, he/she is […] psychotic […].’5
The rule refers to the specific medical condition of being psychotic. Neither of the 
medical systems DSM-5 or ICD-10 define the concept ‘psychotic’. The idea that cer-
tain disorders have a psychotic nature is, however, a clearly understood and has a 
long tradition of use among psychiatrists,6 and there is a large degree of consensus in 
3 DSM-5 (2013) p. 25.
4 Moore, The quest for a responsible responsibility test: Norwegian insanity law after Breivik, 
Criminal Law and Philosophy 9(4) (2015), pp. 651–652. 
5 LOV-2005-05-20-28 om straff (Penal Code), unofficial Lovdata translation. The law has 
recently been amended and the King in the Council of State has sanctioned the amendment 
(21 June 2019), but the amended rule is not yet in effect. For a discussion of the amended 
version of the rule, see section 3.4.2.
6 Moore (2015), pp. 665–657.
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modern psychiatry as to which abnormal conditions are to be considered as psycho-
sis illnesses. This is also evident from the proposal for the new ICD-11, where these 
disorders are distinguished from non-psychotic disorders and put under the heading 
‘Schizophrenia or other primary psychotic disorders’.7
Even though the starting point for this category of criteria is the reference to a 
specific medical diagnosis, the precise content of the rule requires further clarifica-
tion through legal interpretation. The interpreter must then ensure that the rule is 
not applied either more widely or narrowly than the purpose of the rule implies.
For example, in the preparatory works to section 20 first paragraph letter b of the 
Penal Code, ‘psychotic’ was understood according to the medical concept, but there 
was still an intended difference between the legal concept and the medical concept. 
‘Psychotic’ in the Penal Code was to be understood as psychotic symptoms of con-
siderable severity. This is different from the concept of psychosis used in medicine, 
which includes states of mind with less severe symptoms. As such, the judicial con-
cept of psychosis was narrower than the medical concept.8
Legal rules with criteria that refer to the diagnosis system as a whole, rather than 
to a particular diagnoses or diagnoses groups, can be said to have criteria referring to 
abstract diagnoses. The characterisation of something as abstract indicates that it is 
not possible to identify and single out specifically; it is, rather, a thought-based con-
cept of meaning.
Such criteria differ from criteria referring to specific diagnoses in the number of 
mental conditions referred to. However, it is a question of systematisation where the 
line between the two types of criteria is drawn. It is, for example, possible to define 
a reference to psychotic disorders as an abstract reference, since the concept of psy-
chosis includes several different diagnoses. 
An example of a rule with a criterion referring to an abstract diagnosis, is the 
M’Naghten rule from England:  
‘[T]to establish a defence on the ground of insanity it must be clearly proved that, at the 
time of committing the act, the accused was labouring under such a defect of reason, 
from disease of the mind, as not to know the nature and quality of the act he was doing, 
or, if he did know it, that he did not know he was doing what was wrong […]’9
The concept ‘disease of the mind’ is wide and is to be understood as referring to men-
tal states that qualify as diseases according to scientific studies, diagnostic manuals 
and medical practice in general. 
7 ICD-11–6. 
8 See Gröning, Haukvik, and Melle, Criminal Insanity, Psychosis and Impaired Reality testing in 
Norwegian Law, Bergen Journal of Criminal Law and Criminal Justice, 7(1) 2019, pp 27-59.
9 R v. M´Naghten (1843), 10 Clark and F 200; 8 ER 718.
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3.3 Non-Medical Criteria
3.3.1 Legal Standards 
3.3.1.1 In General
Most legal rules that attach legal consequences to mental conditions rely on con-
ventional understandings of psychological abnormalities without reference to strict 
medical concepts. They typically reflect ordinary and widespread perceptions of hu-
mans as rational actors, and they regulate different types of non-rational behaviour.
In general, there will be an overlap between such understandings of mental devi-
ations and what is reflected in medical diagnosis systems, even though the non-med-
ical understandings are normally vaguer. From a legal perspective, however, the 
point is that a rule relying on a conventional understanding refrains from the use of 
medical diagnoses to clarify and limit the rule. 
Such rules can be seen as legal standards, which implies that the legal criteria are 
often vague and open to factual changes and value-based interpretation. The exact 
content of the legal concept often needs to be clarified and updated in court practice. 
In other words, such criteria differ from criteria referring to diagnoses by being more 
open to the kinds of mental illness that will qualify under the rule. 
The Finnish insanity rule requires a ‘mental disorder’, which is a concept to be un-
derstood in accordance with the terminology adopted in the Finnish mental health 
care legislation, and includes psychotic conditions.10 The criterion is, however, not 
fully tied to medical concepts, and it will be sufficient to rely on non-medical under-
standings of abnormality to apply the rule. In the preparatory works, it is specifically 
stated that the criterion is not be understood medically or on the basis of medical 
diagnosis systems, but according to its ordinary meaning in everyday language. This 
is to prevent ‘differences between various schools of psychiatry from influencing the 
deliberations of the courts’.11 At the same time, it specified that this does not imply a 
complete departure from ‘the medical-legal understanding of the terms.’12 
Another example of a rule with criteria that refers to a non-medical concept is 
the criminal insanity rule in section 20 of the German Penal Code: 
‘Any person who at the time of the commission of the offence is incapable of appreciating 
the unlawfulness of their actions or of acting in accordance with any such appreciation 
10 See chapter 3, section 4, of the Finnish Penal Code, Finnish Mental Health Act of 14 December 
1990 No. 1116 and Finnish Government Proposition No. 44/2002 to Parliament, p. 62 (RP 
44/2002 rd: Regeringens proposition till Riksdagen med förslag till revidering av lagstiftningen 
om straffrättens allmänna läror).
11 Finnish Government Proposition No. 44/2002 to Parliament, p. 62.
12 Ibid. 
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due to a pathological mental disorder, a profound consciousness disorder, debility or any 
other serious mental abnormality, shall be deemed to act without guilt.’13
As can be seen, the rule starts with the criterion ‘pathological mental disorder’, 
which refers to a concept that includes various psychotic disorders of both organic 
and non-organic origin, but this medical criterion is complemented by ‘other seri-
ous mental abnormality’, a non-medical concept that encompasses a group of mental 
states not subject to medical categorisation. 
3.3.1.2 Specific, Abstract and Disputed Reference 
Legal standards can be more or less specific in their description of the mental entities 
they refer to. The above-mentioned criteria in the Finnish and German rules both have 
an abstract reference, but in the same rules you also find criteria with specific reference. 
As shown above, the German rule includes a large number of divergent mental 
states. But it also limits the extent of the rule by specifying certain criteria in addition 
to the relevant mental states: it requires that the deviation must have resulted in the 
perpetrator being ‘incapable of appreciating the unlawfulness of [his or her] actions’, 
or of ‘acting in accordance with any such appreciation’.
We find a similar limiting criterion in the Finnish legislation, where the rule re-
quires that the person, because of his or her illness, ‘is unable to understand the fac-
tual or illegal nature of the act’. Alternatively, the person will be exempt from crim-
inal responsibility ‘if his or her ability to control his or her actions is for any such 
reason reduced to a significant extent’.14
There is, however, an inherent risk in specifying mental entities by relying on 
conventional understandings without reference to medical concepts: This leaves 
room for discussion as to whether the mental phenomena referred to exist at all. 
And, assuming they do, there might not be consensus on how the defining character-
istics of these mental states are to be understood. This is less of a risk for legal rules 
that refer to medical concepts, as these concepts are developed within a profession 
relying on extensive experience, research and theories. 
For example, the above-mentioned specific references in the Finish and German 
rules at first seem reasonable from a conceptual perspective, as they address features 
in the perpetrator’s mind that are normally considered highly relevant according to 
the justifications for punishment as described in section 2.15 
13 Section 20, German Penal Code (Strafgesetzbuch) in the version promulgated on 13 November 
1998, Federal Law Gazette (Bundesgesetzblatt) last amended by Article 3 of the Law of 2 
October 2009, Federal Law Gazette I p. 3214.
14 Chapter 3, section 4 of the Finnish Penal Code (Strafflagen).
15 For a critique see Moore (2015) pp. 657–663 and 666–669.
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On the other hand, however, there is a general point of view in medicine that a psycho-
sis will afflict the mind as a whole.16 And if psychosis by definition—and therefore in all 
cases—afflicts the mind as a whole, one can argue that all psychotic perpetrators with 
symptoms of considerable severity will fulfil the criterion ‘is unable to understand the 
factual or illegal nature of the act’ or any similar criteria. In other words, it won’t make 
sense to single out persons by the limiting criteria in the Finish and German rules 
when the person has a psychosis or any other disease that afflicts the mind as a whole.
Hence, conventional understandings might deviate from medical understandings 
of mental entities, and one might ask whether the mental entities referred to in the rules 
exist at all. In other words, legal standards might refer to disputed mental phenomena.
 
3.3.2 Value Judgments
Legal rules usually consist of criteria referring to more or less specific entities in the 
world and, as shown by the examples above, law applies to more or less predefined 
facts of a medical or non-medical nature. On the state level, rules with clear legal 
concepts ensure the separation of powers, and for the citizens they secure predict-
ability and equal treatment. 
In some areas of the law you find rules that leave a great deal of judicial discretion 
to the decision-maker, in the sense that he or she decides whether the rule applies 
to the facts. Normally, a rule on criminal insanity will consist of criteria that give 
a more or less substantial definition of criminal insanity, but it is also possible to 
structure these rules such that it is left to the decision-maker to decide and justify the 
concept of criminal insanity. 
The Danish rule on criminal insanity defines the group not liable to punishment 
as whoever was, at the time of the act, of ‘unsound mind because of insanity’.17 Ac-
cording to the wording, the concept of insanity is left open, as the criterion presup-
poses the existence of a suitable definition with the reference ‘because of insanity’. 
It is left to the decision-maker to conduct a value judgment deciding whether the 
unsound mind is to be considered a result of insanity.
A criterion with an even more unmitigated value judgment is found in the 
amended Norwegian insanity rule:
‘Offenders who at the time of the act are insane due to a severe divergent state of mind 
are not accountable. When deciding whether a person is insane emphasis shall be placed 
on the degree of failure of understanding reality and functional ability.’18 
16 Criminal Capacity, Expertise and Societal Protection, NOU 2014: 10 English Translation, Excerpts, 
pp. 122–124, https://www.regjeringen.no/contentassets/42efeed9ff864a8f891aa6536748e264/en-
gb/pdfs/nou201420140010000engpdfs.pdf (Last accessed 9th September 2019)
17 Section 16 of the Danish Penal Code (Straffeloven).
18 My translation. 
86
Anders Løvlie
The definition is close to circular and, as a result, the rule contains no clear reference 
to what mental conditions are relevant (see section 3.4.2). In practice, the proposal 
leaves it to the courts to clarify the concept of criminal insanity.
3.4 Combination of Criteria 
3.4.1 In General
Awareness of the distinction between medical criteria and non-medical criteria, and 
to what degree the criteria refer to specific entities, is essential for making rational 
decisions about laws on criminal insanity. 
Most legal rules on criminal insanity define the group not to be held liable for 
their actions on the basis of several legal criteria. There are several possible combina-
tions of criteria one can use to define groups with divergent mental states, both for 
rules on criminal insanity and for other rules which take divergent mental states to 
be a mitigating factor. 
The rule can rely on a single criterion, such as the Norwegian rule on criminal in-
sanity, which refers to the specific medical condition ‘psychotic’, as well as the amend-
ed Norwegian rule, which refers to a value judgment (see section 3.2.2 and 3.3.2).  
The rule can combine a medical criterion with a non-medical criterion, a strategy 
which would be sensible if certain serious illnesses fall outside the scope of a specific 
or abstract diagnosis, but still is considered legally equivalent to mental states that 
fall within. For example, one could, in addition to the criterion ‘psychotic’, add a cri-
terion with a non-medical reference to mental states resembling psychotic states. 
The rule can also start out with a criterion with a medical or a non-medical refer-
ence and limit the scope with a narrowing criterion. In the English M’Naghten rule, 
also adopted by many U.S. states, the initial criterion is that the person must have 
been ‘labouring under […] a defect of reason, from disease of the mind’,19 narrowed 
by a requirement that the perpetrator ‘[did not] know the nature and quality of the 
act he was doing’ or ‘did not know he was doing what was wrong’. As shown in sec-
tion 3.3.2, the Danish rule on criminal insanity has a similar structure with a val-
ue-based limiting criterion.  
3.4.2 The Amendment of the Norwegian Rule on Criminal Insanity
The Norwegian rule on criminal insanity has been under continuous debate, eval-
19 Regina v. M´Naghten, 10 Clark and F 200, 8 Eng. Rep. 718 (1843).
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uated by different state commissions, and amended on several occasions.20 Tradi-
tionally, the construction of the rule has been considered as a choice between three 
models.21 
The first alternative is characterised as a psychological model, which is based on a 
non-medical criterion with reference to conventional understandings of psycholog-
ical abnormalities, as described in section 3.3.1. The decisive criterion concerns the 
perpetrator’s ability, insight, and prospects for exercising free choice. The question 
when faced with a mentally aberrant offender is whether the person retains such ca-
pacity. In order to be punished, he or she must, for example, have been without the 
ability to understand the illegal nature of the act.
The second alternative is characterised as a medical model, which is based on a 
medical criterion. Whether or not a person shall be deemed to have been of unsound 
mind is exclusively determined on the basis of medical characteristics, and no enqui-
ries are to be made into whether the act was pathologically motivated or whether the 
perpetrator understood what he or she was doing.
Finally, we have the mixed model, which is based on a medical criterion and a 
non-medical criterion. In order to conclude that the perpetrator was of unsound 
mind, he or she must have suffered a specified aberration, and, in addition, there 
must be some kind of link between the disorder and the criminal act.
A commission appointed after the tragic incident of July 22nd 2011 is the latest to 
evaluate the Norwegian rule on criminal inanity. In addition, the commission eval-
uated the role of psychiatry in the administration of criminal justice, and addressed 
the incapacitation of persons of unsound mind who may be dangerous. 22 
The commission’s deliberations on the rules on criminal insanity made use of the 
above-mentioned models when it evaluated whether or not the rule based on a cri-
terion with reference to a specific medical condition should be changed (see section 
3.2.2). The commission recommended to keep a medical criterion as the core of the 
rule, and to add an alternative non-medical criterion formulated as a legal standard 
referring to states of mind that must be equated to the states of mind that fall within 
the medical criterion: 
20 See Bill Draft nr. 87 for 1993–94 (Ot.prp. nr. 87 (1993–94) Om lov om endringer i straffeloven 
m.v (strafferettslige utilregnelighetsregler og særreaksjoner), Official Norwegian Report 1990: 5 
(NOU 1990: 5 Strafferettslige utilregnelighetsregler og særreaksjoner –Straffelovkommisjonens 
delutredning IV) and Official Norwegian Report 1974: 17 (NOU 1974: 17 Strafferettslig 
utilregnelighet og strafferettslige særreaksjoner).
21 See Syse Strafferettslig (u)tilregnelighet juridiske, moralske og faglige dilemmaer (Criminal 
Insanity – Judicial, moral and professional dilemmas) in Tidsskrift for strafferett 2006 pp. 141–
175 and Official Norwegian Report 2014: 10 English Translation, Excerpts Criminal Capacity, 
Expertise and Societal Protection pp. 44 and 100–114 (NOU 2014: 10 Skyldevne, sakkyndighet 
og samfunnsvern).
22 Criminal Capacity, Expertise and Societal Protection, Official Norwegian Report NOU 2014: 
10 English Translation p. 11.
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‘A person deemed by the court to have been in a psychotic state at the time of committing 
the act or in a state that, with regard to functional impairment, distorted thinking and 
otherwise inability to understand his or her relationship with the outside world, must be 
deemed equivalent to a psychotic state, shall not incur criminal liability. The same ap-
plies to a person who acted in a state of severely impaired consciousness.
Nor shall a person who was intellectually disabled to a high degree, or corresponding-
ly debilitated, incur criminal liability.’23
If such a state is the consequence of self-induced intoxication, however, this shall not 
exclude punishment according to the proposal.
According to the proposal the perpetrator must, then, have been in a ‘psychotic’ 
state at the time of committing the act. ‘Psychotic’ shall be understood as a legal con-
cept limited by the use of a medical concept, but the legal criterion is only met if the of-
fender suffered from a psychotic disorder and the symptoms were of a certain intensity. 
This is clear from the symptom specification included in the wording of the proposal. 
This part of the regulation was meant to maintain and clarify the current regulation. 
The suggested rule also includes aberrations not classified as psychosis in the med-
ical sense. The term ‘must be deemed equivalent to a psychotic state’ implies that the 
rule also captures other mental deviations, including non-medical ones. This alter-
native is to be understood narrowly, and the question to be asked is whether the dis-
order interfered with the psyche and motivations of the perpetrator in a similar and 
correspondingly fundamental manner as a state of psychosis with severe symptoms.
The government chose not to follow the commission’s recommendation and in-
stead proposed a rule on criminal insanity with a non-medical criterion formulated 
as a value judgment:  
‘Offenders who at the time of the act are insane due to a severe mental illness are not 
accountable. When deciding whether a person is insane emphasis shall be placed on the 
degree of failure of understanding reality and functional ability. 
Nor shall a person who was intellectually disabled to a high degree, or corresponding-
ly debilitated, incur criminal liability.’24 
The proposal was under consideration by the parliamentary Standing Committee on 
Justice from 19 October 2017 to 5 May 2019. The committee substituted the term ‘se-
vere mental illness’ with the term ‘severe divergent state of mind’ (see section 3.3.2). 
23 Criminal Capacity, Expertise and Societal Protection, Official Norwegian Report NOU 2014: 
10 English Translation p. 277 (Proposal for amending the General Civil Penal Code 1902 
section 44. Not official translation. The Code has itself been amended since the proposal).
24 Norwegian Government Proposition 154 L (2016–2017) to Parliament, p. 236 ((Prop. 154 L 
(2016–2017) Endringer i straffeloven og straffeprosessloven mv. (skyldevne, samfunnsvern og 
sakkyndighet)) and recommendation Innst. 296 L (2018–2019) by The Standing Committee on 
Justice to the Storting. ((Innst. 296 L (2018–2019) Innstilling fra justiskomiteen om Endringer 
i straffeloven og straffeprosessloven mv. (skyldevne, samfunnsvern og sakkyndighet)). My 
translation and restatement.
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During the period the proposal was heavily criticised in two hearings before the 
committee and in the media, and the decision to propose it as an amendment was 
postponed several times.25
Finally, the committee split into two factions. The majority rejected the propos-
al and recommended the parliament to return the proposal to the government. Its 
main arguments were that the proposal had not been adequately prepared and not 
been subject to a public consultation process. It also found that the criteria were too 
vague and left too much discretion to the courts, risking arbitrary decisions. 
However, the minority in the committee, representing the majority parties in 
parliament, recommended passing the bill.26 Its main argument was that the courts 
should decide on whether the perpetrator had sufficient mental capacity for pun-
ishment, as medical experts were too influential in the process of applying the law 
under the existing rule. The minority found the content of the rule sufficiently clear 
when taking the preparatory work into account, and also argued that it would be 
clarified through court practice. 
Parliament ultimately passed the bill, and the amendment to the Penal Code sec-
tion 20 was sanctioned by the King in the Council of State on 21 June 2019, but it is 
not yet in effect.
4. Evidential Perspective 
4.1 Introduction  
All rules on criminal insanity presuppose certain characteristics in the psyche of the 
offender. Rules on criminal insanity differ conceptually, and the choice of legal crite-
ria is decisive for whether legal consequences are attached to a mental phenomenon. 
But it is not only the conceptual level that decides the scope of the law. The legally 
relevant phenomenon must also be identified and proven to a certain degree for the 
rule to apply in a given case. The point made in the following is that the conceptual 
choice is also an evidential choice, as it determines the characteristics of what can be 
the object of proof, and different characteristics require different types of evidence. 
When discussing objects of proof, it is necessary to distinguish factual questions from 
25 See Vi risikerer å få en utilregnelighetsbestemmelse som åpner for altfor stor grad av skjønn 
(We risk a rule on criminal insanity that allows for far too much discretion), Feature story 
in Aftenposten April 28th 2019 and Utilregnelighet til besvær – igjen (Insanity trouble – 
again), Feature story in Morgenbladet January 5. 2018. See also the majority’s argumetation 
in Innst. 296 L (2018–2019) pages 8–10. The author has been a part of a group criticising the 
government’s proposal.  
26 Recommendation Innst. 296 L (2018-2019) by The Standing Committee on Justice to the 
Storting. ((Innst. 296 L (2018-2019) Innstilling fra justiskomiteen om Endringer i straffeloven 
og straffeprosessloven mv. (skyldevne, samfunnsvern og sakkyndighet)).
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legal questions. Legal questions relate to the assessment of phenomena to which le-
gal effects are linked, whereas factual questions relate to the existence of such legally 
relevant phenomena. For a rule on criminal insanity, the legal question is whether 
the mental state of the offender is such that it fulfils the legal definition of insanity, 
whereas the factual question is whether the offender in fact suffered from the rele-
vant mental state.  
Section 4.2 addresses some questions of general interest when evaluating evi-
dence for assertions about mental entities. In section 4.3 different evidential features 
following from the conceptual choice of criteria are addressed, and I distinguish be-
tween features that follow from a medical criterion on the one hand, and features 
that follow from a non-medical criterion on the other. Finally, in section 4.4 the role 
of medical expertise under different criteria is addressed. 
4.2 General Evidential Issues
With evidence, we normally refer to something that demonstrates something else—a 
fact invoked to establish or refute another fact. For a legal rule on criminal insanity 
the evidential question is what kind of facts can be considered evidence of the psyche 
of the offender.
Firstly, external behaviour may function as evidence for states of mind. The use 
of such external factors itself relies on evidence in the form of observation and expe-
rience. To understand the rationale of letting behaviour count as evidence, it is nec-
essary to understand the connection between the evidence and the object of proof. 
Our understanding of human behaviour derives from the understanding of hu-
man beings as rational agents, and there exist more and less explicit and clear theo-
ries about what kind of behaviour is to be expected in specific situations and cultures. 
The interpretation of certain behaviours may vary across different times and settings, 
as it depends on experience and cultural factors. Behaviour considered irrational in 
some social groups might be considered rational in other groups. 
There can be uncertainty and disagreement as to how an offender’s external be-
haviour is to be understood, and what inferences that can be drawn from the be-
haviour. Uncertainty may also arise as to whether the external behaviour actually 
took place, or precisely how it manifested itself. 
Secondly, internal mental entities like ideas, thoughts, and feelings may be evi-
dence for states of mind. Such entities can be inferred from the person’s external be-
haviour as described above, but an additional source of evidence might be the person 
communicating their own perception of the entities based on introspective experience. 
Uncertainty concerning introspective experience can arise if it is unclear whether 
the person is capable of or willing to engage in introspection and whether the infor-
mation is communicated correctly through common concepts.
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4.3 Special Evidential Issues  
4.3.1 Medical Criteria 
Legal criteria referring to medical entities use diagnosis systems as tools to clarify 
and define the group not to be held criminally liable. As shown in section 3.2.2, the 
reference to the diagnosis system can be broad or narrow, and from an analytical 
perspective we may distinguish between criteria that make specific reference to these 
systems and criteria that make abstract reference to them.
The medical systems ICD-10 and DSM-5 define diagnoses partly based on the 
nature of the symptoms, partly on their intensity, and partly on duration. However, 
the systems themselves do not stipulate any final conclusions, but leave this to a dis-
cretionary clinical assessment of the relevant medical symptoms. 
The special evidential feature of criteria referring to specific medical concepts (i.e., 
those that rely on specific diagnoses) is that they impose on the fact-finder to clarify 
the content of the relevant diagnostic norm system. In addition to the general evidential 
features as described in section 4.2, the fact-finder must also identify what signifi-
cance the evidence has as symptoms according to the criteria in the diagnosis system. 
It is a matter of systematisation whether this activity should be understood as 
a part of the interpretation process when clarifying the precise content of the legal 
norm, or as an identification of an institutional fact to which the legal norm attach-
es consequences. However, from a functional perspective, the diagnosis system lays 
outside of, and is required by, the legal norm.
4.3.2 Non-Medical Criteria
As shown in section 3.3, it is possible to construct a rule on criminal insanity from 
criteria without reference to medical concepts. These criteria were categorised as le-
gal standards and value judgments, and refer more or less directly to the perpetra-
tor’s ability, insight, and prospects for exercising free choice. 
In addition to clarifying the content of the rule on a conceptual level, one will 
have to identify relevant mental states when applying the rule. Due to the lack of a 
theoretical and empirical basis for conventional understandings of mental concepts 
and psychological abnormalities this can turn out to be an epistemic and evidential 
challenge, as there are no clear directives for how to define relevant symptoms or 
their intensity and duration.
This challenge increases for legal standards referring to disputed mental phenom-
ena (see section 3.3.1.2), where uncertainty on the conceptual level transfers to the 
evidential level. Provided that the phenomenon in question exists at all, the lack of 
empirical and theoretical bases makes it questionable whether it can be identified. 
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For example, the English M’Naghten rule consists of the initial criterion ‘labouring 
under […] a defect of reason, from disease of the mind’. This broad scope is then nar-
rowed by the use of the following non-medical criteria: ‘[did not] know the nature 
and quality of the act he was doing’ or ‘did not know he was doing what was wrong’. 
These narrowing criteria first meet resistance on a conceptual level, as the general 
view in medicine is that psychosis, which is a common ‘disease of the mind’ under 
the M’Naghten rule, affects or afflicts the mind as a whole (see section 3.3.1.2). 
Furthermore, even if we accept the concepts in question and find it clear what we 
are looking for, the medical understanding of the effects of psychosis implies that it 
will be very difficult, if not impossible, to exclude the possibility that the mental dis-
order affected the person’s knowledge about his actions or the wrongness of them in 
one way or another. 
It seems then that we meet obstacles on the conceptual and evidential level when 
deciding on whether someone who had a defect of reason from disease of mind ac-
tually knew ‘the nature and quality of the act’ and similar criteria. This challenge can 
arise for most criteria referring to the perpetrator’s insight into his own actions. 
One can observe that this challenge is also reflected on a conceptual level in the 
structure of the rule, as there would be no point having the initial criterion ‘a defect 
of reason, from disease of the mind’, if there were no conceptual or evidential chal-
lenges in identifying persons who ‘[did not] know the nature and quality of the act 
he was doing’ or ‘did not know he was doing what was wrong’, as these criteria reflect 
the excusing grounds.27 
4.4 Medical Expertise 
Psychiatrists and psychologists have special knowledge about mental illness, and 
persons from these professions are often consulted in both the process of making 
and of applying rules on criminal insanity.  
The role of the medical expert in court is defined by the fact-law dichotomy de-
scribed in section 4.1. Fundamentally, it is a legal question to decide whether a given 
mental condition or state of mind is of relevance according to the rule. The experts 
are not professionally equipped to answer whether the accused was mentally dis-
turbed to such a degree that the rule on criminal insanity applies.
The experts are to supply the court with information about how to understand 
the facts, and it is for the court to decide whether the accused is liable. This role im-
plies that the expert shall aid in general evidential issues (see section 4.2). He or she 
is to report on the offender’s mental state on the basis of both experience and theo-
retical knowledge. More specifically, the expert is to help the factfinder understand 
27 For a critique of such criteria, see Moore (2015) pp. 661–663.
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the evidence by identifying external and internal symptoms and clarify what these 
symptoms imply (see section 4.2).
The medical expert’s further role depends on the conceptual design of the legal 
rules. If the rule consists of medical criteria, it will be sensible for the fact-finder to 
seek assistance from experts on special evidential issues. More precisely, medical ex-
perts can share knowledge about the relevant diagnostic norm system, and their expe-
rience from the systematisation of mental illnesses within the system (see section 4.3). 
It is also common to seek assistance from medical experts when applying rules 
with non-medical criteria. However, it is important to be aware that expert faces the 
same evidential challenges as the nonprofessional when it comes to concepts that are 
without empirical, theoretical or consensual basis. This is especially the case for dis-
puted mental phenomena (see section 3.3.1.2 and 4.3.2).
5. The Standard of Proof
5.1 Introduction
From sections 3 and 4 it follows that the legal criteria define what has to be proven to 
apply a rule on criminal insanity, and that different evidential features follow from 
the choice of criteria. To what extent an object of proof must be proven follows from 
the standard of proof, a rule that establishes a threshold of certainty that must be met 
before a factual proposition is considered to be proven for the purposes of the trial.
In the following, the importance of formulating the object of proof and the bur-
den of proof is addressed in sections 5.2 and 5.3. Then, arguments for setting the 
threshold under the standard of proof are addressed in section 5.4. Finally, I clarify 
more precisely which evidential features are regulated by the standard in section 5.5. 
5.2 Object of Proof
The content of the standard of proof is closely connected to the object of proof. The 
standard depends on what is to be proven and it is, therefore, regardless of the choice 
of concept, necessary to first decide whether the object of proof is to be the perpetra-
tors soundness of mind or the perpetrators unsoundness of mind. This choice must 
be made before the threshold for proof is set for a rule on criminal insanity. 
Normally, the formulation of the object of proof will follow from the structure of 
the jurisdiction’s criminal law and criminal procedure law. As the state generally has 
the burden of proof in criminal cases, in that they are to fulfil certain legal criteria be-
fore punishment can be imposed, the default object of proof is the perpetrator’s sound-
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ness of mind and it is for the prosecution to prove that this requirement is fulfilled. 
This default position might be waived depending on the jurisdiction’s systemati-
sation of criteria for punishment (see section 2). But also in traditions were it is said 
that the defence has the burden of proof, the default rule applies as the government 
asserts sanity by the indictment. It has been argued that the object of proof should 
always be the person’s unsoundness of mind, since every citizen should prima facie 
be considered as a responsible human actor. However, in cases concerning the rule 
on criminal insanity, it is exactly this presumption which is at stake.
5.3 The Burden of Proof 
The burden of proof determines which party has the obligation to produce evidence 
to pass the standard of proof. As a result of different procedural structures, rules on 
burden of proof differ between jurisdictions.  
Anglo-American criminal procedure tends to leave the investigative element 
with the parties. In England, the burden of proof under the M’Naghten rule is put on 
the defendant who invokes the defence of criminal insanity. This is in contrast to the 
Norwegian system, which by and large leaves the investigation to the prosecuting au-
thority in the initial stages, but leaves the ultimate responsibility for establishing the 
facts of the case on the courts. In this system, it is for the prosecution to prove that all 
criteria for the use of punishment are present. 
5.4 The Standard Threshold 
The standard of proof regulates to which degree a party that has the burden of proof 
must prove the object of proof. For a rule on criminal insanity the standard threshold 
defines the acceptable level of risk of convicting a criminally irresponsible perpetra-
tor. 
In criminal law, the default standard of proof is that any reasonable doubt shall 
benefit the accused (in dubio pro reo). The values underlying this threshold are that 
it is considered extremely important to prevent innocent persons from being con-
victed. An additional argument is that a lower threshold might undermine citizens’ 
confidence in the administration of justice by signalling that incorrect convictions 
are accepted.
Even though this high threshold is accepted as the general default standard in 
criminal law, most jurisdictions do not apply the standard when it comes to the ques-
tion of criminal insanity. In England, for example, the standard under the M’Naghten 
rule is a ‘preponderance of evidence’ that the perpetrator was in a state of unsound 
mind. In Norway, it is stated in court practice that the principle of proof beyond rea-
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sonable doubt applies to the question of whether the accused was of sound mind, but 
that the threshold is lower than for questions relating to the perpetrator’s physical 
movements.28
If one accepts the general justifications for the standard of proof in criminal law, 
lower thresholds like these imply an acceptance of innocent persons being found 
guilty. There has not been much discussion about how a lower threshold affects the 
initial value judgment that it is extremely important to avoid erroneous convictions, 
or why the standard of proof with regard to soundness of mind should be lower than 
that used with regard to the person’s physical movements. In some jurisdictions is 
it not quite clear what the value arguments are for lowering the threshold. In other 
jurisdictions we find arguments regarding societal protection and treatment, but one 
might ask whether such considerations are relevant for the distribution of risk when 
it comes to the use of punishment.29
However, an evidential argument for lowering the threshold has been raised, 
which is that it is generally considered difficult to determine whether the perpetrator 
was of unsound mind. The argument is that since the object of proof in itself is more 
difficult to prove than the other requirements for the use of punishment, without a 
lower threshold one might risk that criminal responsibility is too difficult to demon-
strate. The quality of this argument depends on one’s conceptual perspective on men-
tal entities and how they are proved (see section 3) and on one’s understanding of 
general evidential issues as to what can be proved (see section 4).  
5.5 Different Evidential Issues 
The object of proof will, as shown in section 5.2, also be decisive for the nature of 
the uncertainty that the standard of proof is to distribute. As it is the persuasive 
power of the evidence that determines the extent to which a factual circumstance is 
proven, the standard of proof is linked to the different characteristics of evidence as 
described in section 4.
Uncertainty related to general evidential issues that concern inferences drawn 
from external behaviour and internal mental entities (described in section 4.2), is 
normally understood as regulated by the general standard of proof. The external and 
the internal symptoms are epistemically distinct, and one can therefore say that the 
standard is versatile as it regulates uncertainty relating to different characteristics. 
Uncertainty relating to specific evidential issues is not necessarily regulated by the 
standard of proof. Doubt as to whether the perpetrator’s established mental condi-
tion falls within the scope of the rule is a doubt of a legal nature and is to be handled 
28 Criminal Capacity, Expertise and Societal Protection, Official Norwegian Report NOU 2014: 
10 English Translation, Excerpts pp. 239–240.
29 Idem, pp. 250–256.
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through an interpretation of the insanity rule. And, further to this, when applying 
rules with medical criteria, uncertainty about the content of the medical diagnosis 
system will have to be handled as a question of legal interpretation, as this is uncer-
tainty about the content of the constituent criteria defining which facts that are legal-
ly relevant, and not about the specific facts.
6. Summary
The presentation has shown that there is a large variety of possibilities when design-
ing a rule on criminal insanity. As for all legal rules, it is important to be aware of 
the underlying justifications to ensure that the rule is designed to be as precise as 
possible. The models presented in section 3 do not grasp all relevant aspects, but 
clearly show different alternatives for constructing rules on criminal insanity. The 
choice of criteria is conceptual, but it has evidential consequences and might also 
affect the standard of proof and the distribution of risk between the parties. 
My purpose has not been to recommend any specific design for a rule on crimi-
nal insanity, but to highlight features relevant to the law maker when designing such 
a rule. When defining the group that falls outside the justification for the use of pun-
ishment, the core values for the Rule of Law should be taken in consideration. The 
main competing values are, on the one hand, legal ideals such as predictability and 
equality, as well as the possibility of control and verifiability, and, on the other hand, 
the need for flexibility and the ability to ensure the rule fulfils its purpose. One could 
say that the rule should be as minimal, clear and constant as possible. In addition, 
one must have in mind that the rule on criminal insanity depends on an understand-
ing of the physical and psychological world, and to what extent the decision-maker 
has access to entities out there—law applies to facts.
